Search results for "Strategic complements"
showing 3 items of 3 documents
Spatial Allocation of European Structural Funds: What Is the Role of Strategic Interactions?
2020
This chapter explores the role of strategic interactions that affect the spatial allocation of structural funds in the European Union. More specifically, this chapter seeks to test if the interactions between government decisions are strategic substitutes or complements in the context of the European structural funds allocation. First, we present a theoretical model which depicts how the strategic interactions could affect the allocation of public grants in a bargaining process. Then, we test the direction of strategic interaction on the allocation of structural funds for the 2000–2006 programming period using spatial econometric techniques. We find a negative spatial interaction between Eu…
Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: Adaptation and Complementarity
2018
This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement. To address this issue we solve a three-stage coalition formation game where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their levels of emissions. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides on its level of adaptation non co-operatively. We solve this game for two models. For both, it is assumed that damages are linear with respect to emissions which guarantee that emissions are strategic complements in the second stage of the game. However, for the …
Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences
2013
Proceeding at: 2nd Annual UECE Lisbon Meeting: Game Theory and Applications, took place 2010, November, 4-6, in Lisbon (Portugal). The event Web site http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~uece/lisbonmeetings2010/ In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players endowed with an idiosyncratic identity interact on a social network through strategic complements or substitutes. We classify the possible types of Nash equilibria under complete information, finding two thr…